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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
Case No. 20150525-CA
ROBERT THOMAS RUST,
Appellant is incarcerated.
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code§ 78A-4-103(2)(e)
li,

(2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment); R.970-71.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION
Issue I: Whether Mr. Rust should be granted a new trial on the money laundering
count where the trial court plainly erred by allowing the State's expert to make casespecific legal conclusions in violation of rules 702, 704, and 403.

Standard ofReview/Preservation: The Court will review the admission of expert
testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah Ct.
App. 1998). This issue may be reached under the doctrine of plain error, which is an
exception to the preservation rule and is reviewed as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v.

Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, if28, 276 P.3d 1207.
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Issue II: Whether Mr. Rust's convictions for money l~undering and conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance should be reversed where the State's witness presented
inherently improbable testimony and its evidence was otherwise inconclusive and
circumstantial.

Standard ofReview and Preservation: This Court will reverse a jury conviction
for insufficient evidence when "the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT
124, if15, 63 P.3d 94. "To prevent unappealable injustice," the Utah Supreme Court has
held "that the definition of inherently improbable must include circumstances where a
witness's testimony is incredibly dubious and, as such, apparently false." State v.

Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ifl8, 210 P.3d 288. This issue is preserved. R.1471.Or, it may be
reached under the doctrine of plain error, which is an exception to the preservation rule
and is reviewed as a matter oflaw. See, e.g., State v. Kozlov, 2012 UT App 114, if28, 276
P.3d 1207.
Issue III: Whether Mr. Rust's convictions for false tax return should be reversed
where there was insufficient evidence presented by the State to show beyond a reasonable
doubt that Rust acted with the intent to evade the taxes he owed.

Standard ofReview and Preservation: As discussed, this Court will reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence when "the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was convicted." Shumway, 2002 UT
2
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124, ,Il5. This issue may be reached under the doctrine of plain error, which is an
~

exception to the preservation rule and is reviewed as a matter oflaw. Kozlov, 2012 UT
App 114, if28.

RELEVANT RULES AND STATUTES
The text of the following provisions are provided in full in Addendum B: Utah R.
Evid. 403, 702, 704; Utah Code§§ 58-37-8, 76-4-201, 76-8-1101 (2012), 76-10-1903.

STATEMENT OF CASE
On February 20, 2013, the State filed an information charging Mr. Rust with one
count of money laundering, a second degree felony, and one count of false tax return, a
third degree felony. R.1-11. A second amended information was subsequently filed on
September 13, 2013, charging Rust with one count of money laundering, a second degree
felony; one count of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, a third degree felony;
and two counts of false/fraudulent tax return, third degree felonies. R.43-53. The State
also gave notice that is would pursue asset forfeiture. R.43-53. Mr. Rust was bound over
on all counts. R.87-88.
On April 28-30, 2015, a three-day jury trial was held. R.879-80, 881-82, 926-27.
After the State rested, defense counsel made a motion for a directed verdict with respect
to the money laundering and conspiracy counts. R.1470-71. The court denied that motion.
R.1474-76. The jury returned a guilty verdict on all counts. R.922, 926-27, 1590. It also
returned a special verdict finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the following property
was forfeitable: $8,744 in U.S. currency seized from Rust's home, Rust's H2 Hummer,
and $28,380.37 in U.S. currency seized from a bank account that was under the name of
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Rust's wife. R.923-25, 1590-91; State's Ex. 28.
On June 23, 2015, the court sentenced Mr. Rust to an indeterminate prison term of
1-15 for money laundering, 0-5 years for conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance,
and 0-5 years for both false/fraudulent tax return counts. R.970-71. It ordered that the
conspiracy and tax counts run concurrently with each other and consecutive to the money
laundering count. R.970-71. Mr. Rust timely appealed. R.993.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
West Valley Police Department Investigation
At the time the investigation began in late 2011, Mr. Rust lived with his wife,
Susanna Rust, at a home on Woodridge Drive in Sandy. R.1115-19, 1192. In February
2012, the West Valley Police Department started surveilling Mr. Rust after they allegedly
received a tip concerning Rust's involvement in narcotics distribution. R.1115-16, 1156.
Officers testified they observed short stay traffic at his home. R.1116-19.
On March 13, 2012, police stopped and searched a vehicle of an individual leaving
Mr. Rust's home and recovered two bags ofmethamphetamine, one containing 47 grams
of the actual drug and the other containing 18.4 grams. R.1129-30, 1158-61; State's Ex.
2. Then on March 27, 2012, they searched another person's vehicle leaving the Rust
home and found a bag with 13.72 grams of methamphetamine.R.1129-30, 1158-61;
State's Ex. 3. On neither of these occasions, however, did the officers witness any type of
transaction or observe the individuals exiting the home with methamphetamine. R.1157-

61.
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During the course of this surveillance, police received additional information
i.;jJ

regarding "a considerable amount of money" that Rust had lost gambling at the Golden
Nugget Casino in Wendover, Nevada. R.1131-33. Officers did not obtain records for
other Nevada casinos, but the gambling activity reports from the Golden Nugget revealed
an "excessive amount of gambling" in 2011-2012. R.1131-33; 1162-64; State's Ex. 4.

The Searches
Based on their investigation, police believed Mr. Rust was engaged in the
distribution of narcotics and obtained a warrant to search (1) Rust's Hummer vehicle, (2)
his home on Woodridge Drive, (3) a home on Hidden View Drive in Sandy they believed
Mr. Rust and his wife were moving into, and (4) a home in South Jordan occupied by
Susana Rust's son. R.1134, 1167-68.

Hummer. The police searched and seized Rust's Hummer on March, 29, 2012,
recovering a "glass pipe" "with a burnt white residue" as well as a cell phone. R.1136-37,
1164-65, 1180-83, 1188-89; State's Ex.12. The glass object was not tested for drugs and
there was no testimony that the cell phone contained anything of evidentiary value.
R.1164, 1188-89, 1201. They also found two small notebooks containing various
numerical computations, which officers believed were "owe sheets"-ledgers used by
drug dealers to document the "drugs out, money in and money owed." R.1136-37, 118788, 1219; State's Ex. 11. An officer further "speculated" that the words "And" and
"boby" in the notebook were the names of individuals linked to the distribution of
methamphetamine. R.1187-88, 1202, 1208-09; State's Ex. 11. No methamphetamine or
other drugs were recovered from the vehicle. R.1165, 1204.
5
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Woodridge Drive Residence. A search of this residence revealed an identification
card in the name of Robert Rust, though it displayed another individual's picture, R.1189,
1192; State's Ex. 13A, and another purported "owe sheet." R.1199. Police also found
between 20-40 Form W-2G receipts from Nevada Casinos (forms for reporting gambling
winnings to the IRS), "very large bladed knives," a syringe, and a small baggy containing
white residue that was found in a room with documents belonging to "Andrew Beck"~

an individual who was living with the Rusts at that time. R.1194-95, 1197-98, 1379.
Hidden View Drive Residence. At this home, searching officers recovered more
alleged "owe sheets," R.1218-19; State's Ex. 17, as well as W-2G gambling forms and
wire transfer receipts with Rust's name on them. R.1220; State's Exs. 18A-F. A scale,
expensive jeans, and a plasma cutter that had been reported stolen were also recovered.
R.1216-17, 1221-23, Exs. 15B, 16. Finally, police found $8,744 in cash as well as
financial documents and wire transfer receipts. R.1169, 1214-16; State's Exs. 15A-E.
South Jordan Home. Police claimed they received information that this home was
a "stash house" and searched it on April 3, 2012. R.1168-69. Officers did not find drugs,
but found a receipt for an America First Credit Union bank account registered to Susana
Rust in the amount of $28,380.37. R.1168-69. That money was seized by the police.
R.1168-69.
Bobby Tate & Desiree Florence

To try to establish that Rust was engaged in a conspiracy to distribute drugs, the
State called Desiree Florence-the girlfriend of Bobby Tate, an individual who the police
believed was selling Rust's drugs. R.1224, 1244-46, 1305. Florence was arrested with a
6
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large amount of methamphetamine in 2012. R.1306-07, 1348-52. She claimed that this
occurred while taking $17,000 to the Rust residence to pay for methamphetamine.
R.1306-07, 1348-52. Florence subsequently pleaded guilty to distribution of a controlled
substance and testified against Rust in exchange for a reduced sentence. R.1307-09,
1348-50; State's Ex. 26.
Florence testified to three encounters during which she believed Tate purchased
vi

drugs from Rust. The first time, Florence claimed she went over to Rust's Woodridge
home, got high, and then "a Mexican came" who she "assumed" Rust got
methamphetamine from. R.1310-11, 1354. Florence never actually saw Rust purchase
methamphetamine from this individual, but testified that Rust and Tate then "split it up."

Id. According to Florence, the second encounter occurred at a Hooters restaurant where
Rust pulled into the parking lot in his Hummer. R.1314-16, 1355-56. Florence testified
that Tate got into the vehicle with Rust and subsequently returned with a quarter pound of
methamphetamine and without the $4000 he previously had. Id. Florence, however, did
not witness the transaction. Id. She also did not witness the third transaction, which
allegedly took place in Rust's vehicle in a hotel parking lot after Tate and Rust
exchanged text messages. R.1316-17, 1360-61. On this occasion, Florence testified that
Tate returned to their hotel room with another quarter pound of methamphetamine he did
~

not previously possess. Id.
Florence also testified that she assisted Tate in selling methamphetamine, often
picking up about 2 pounds of the drug a day. R.1313. She claimed that Tate would make
arrangements to buy and sell methamphetamine by calling or texting on his cell phone.
7
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R.1327, 1355. At trial, she identified a cell phone that she believed belonged to Tate.
R.1253-54, 1329, 1409, 1417; State's Bxs. 24-25. That phone contained text messages
from a contact referred to as "ghost" and "ghostl." Id. According to Florence and police
officers, "ghost" was Robert Rust's nickname, though the phone number associated with
"ghost" was registered to Susana Rust. Id. Florence claimed that the texts received from
"ghost" related to the purchase of drugs. R.1328-40; Ex. 24A-B. Florence also testified
that when Rust was in Nevada gambling, Tate would arrange to purchase
methamphetamine on his phone, wire money to Rust via Western Union transfer, and
then pick up methamphetamine from "Mexicans," who would package the drug in Little
Debbie "Honey Bun" boxes. R.1341-42, 1346; State's Bxs. 18 & 20C.
After receiving methamphetamine from the "Mexicans" one time, Tate was
arrested. R.1344-45. On this occasion, Tate and two passengers attempted to flee from
the police and threw a number of items out the window. R.1224-34, 1236-37, Exs. 20-23.
One of these items was a "Honey Bun" box containing methamphetamine. Id. Tate's
arrest for illegal drugs on this occasion was one of many. R.124 7. Police claimed that Mr.
Rust was more "careful" in avoiding detection. R.1258-59.
Expert Testimony Relating to the Money Laundering Count
The State's expert, Agent Sperry, examined Rust's financials and tax records
during the 16-month period between January, 2011 and May, 2012. R.1370-71, 1412. He
identified two legitimate sources of income, which included income from a Panda
Express restaurant and Jani-King, the Rust's janitorial business. Id. In 2011, the Rusts
received income of $14,484.24 from Panda Express and $2,538.19 from Jani-King.
8
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R.1373-75; State's Exs. 37-41. And in 2012, they received $4,312.63 from Panda Express
and $5,575.26 from Jani-King. Id. According to the expert, there were no other legitimate
sources of income located. R.1375, 1412. The expert made a summary of the Rusts'
disposable income during this timeframe and concluded that $351,262.60 of that income
came from illegal activity. R.1412, 1433; State's Ex. 41.
Bank Accounts. The expert also identified three American First Credit Union bank
accounts, "Account 1 (0207)," "Account 2 (7797)," and "Account 3 (0221)." R.1383-86.
Exs. 27-28. Account 1 was in the name of Robert and Susana Rust, Account 2 was in the
name of Susana Rust and M. Enrique Machorro, and Account 3 was in the name of
Susana Rust and Cynthia Y. Rodriguez. Id. The expert testified that $78,455, $13,400,
$27,161 was deposited into Accounts 1, 2, and 3 respectively in 2011, and $6,200,
$43,250, $2,795 deposited into Accounts 1, 2, and 3 respectively in 2012. R.1383-86.
Exs. 27-28. He further testified that the majority of the deposits were cash deposits not
coming from Panda Express or Jani-King. R.1384-85, Ex. 28. Based on his review of the
account configuration and activity, he determined there was evidence of "structuring"depositing money in an amount under 10,000 into several accounts to avoid the
requirements of the bank secrecy acts-as well as evidence of "layering"-transferring
money between multiple accounts in order to make it more difficult to trace its source.
R.1387-90. The expert further testified that "structuring," "layering," and depositing cash
from drug sales constitute forms of money laundering. R.1406-07.
Gambling. The expert reviewed records of Rust's gambling activity from the
Golden Nugget casino in Wendover, NV. R.1380-81; see also State's Ex. 4. He testified
9
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that "it's not unusual" for drug dealers to use casinos to launder money, despite the net
losses incurred. R.13 81-82. In his experience, the expert explained, individuals often use
W-2G gambling winning receipts or casino accounts to make it look like "money ...
came from gambling rather than illegal activity." R.1381. He testified that conversion of
money attained from drug sales into a casino qualifies as money laundering. R.1404.
Vehicles/Wire Transfers/Prepaid Debit Cards. The expert also testified about
vehicles the Rusts purchased, which included a cash-purchased Cadillac Escalade as well
as a Hummer purchased by cashier's check and cash. R.1390-93; State's Exs. 34-36.
According to the expert, the large cash purchases suggested that Rust had access to large
amounts of cash from illegitimate sources. R.1394-95.
Additionally, the expert made a summary of the various wire transfers sent to Rust
and his wife, in total, about 10-12 transfers amounting to $5,894 in 2011 and $26,886 in
2012. R.1395-98; State's Ex. 30. Bobby Tate and Rust himself were among the sending
parties. R.1397-99; State's Ex. 30. The expert also testified about Rust's use of prepaid
debit cards. R.1399-1402; State's Exs. 31-33. He explained that drug dealers often wire
money to themselves and use prepaid debit cards to avoid carrying large quantities of
cash. R.13 99. According to the expert, receiving drug money via wire transfer and using
drug money to purchase vehicles and reload debit cards constitutes money laundering.
R.1404-07.
Expert Testimony Relating to the Tax Counts

The State's tax expert testified that individuals are required to report wage and
self-employment income, both legal and illegal, as well as other types of income, such as
IO
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gambling winnings and bank account interest. R.1448-51, 1465; Ex. 4 7. The expert also
looked at Rust's 2011 and 2012 tax returns. R.1463.
The Rust's 2011 joint tax return was prepared by a paid tax preparer and listed
three dependent nieces and nephews. R.1440-41,1444; State's Exs. 42-44. The 2011 tax
records list $16,707 in wages and $10 in interest, with total income reported as $16,717.
R.1441-43; State's Exs. 42-44. The Rusts did not report income from Jani-King or other
income, such as gambling winnings. R.1376, 1413; State's Exs. 42-44.
In 2012, Mr. Rust filed separately from Susana Rust and claimed one dependent,
listing his relationship to that dependent as "other." R.1454; State's Exs. 45-46. The tax
documents revealed $15,095 in business income, presumably from Jani-King, with
adjusted gross income amounting to $14,029. R.1454-55; State's Exs. 45-46. It did not
list wages from Panda Express or other sources of income, including gambling winnings
or interest. R.1454-60; State's Exs. 45-46.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
First, this Court should reverse Mr. Rust's money laundering conviction because
the trial court plainly erred by admitting expert opinion testimony that was inadmissible
under rules 702, 704, and 403. Expert opinion testimony is inadmissible if it is couched
as a legal conclusion or gives an opinion as to whether actions, like the defendant's
actions, are illegal. In this case, the State's expert made improper legal conclusions about
the elements of the offense when he concluded that a list of case-specific hypotheticals
constituted "money laundering." The expert's testimony was also incorrect because it
suggested that money laundering could be committed without a culpable mental state.
11
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This improper conclusion testimony created a danger that the jurors might tum to the
expert rather than the judge for guidance and could have misled the jury into convicting
based on non-criminal conduct. This issue may be reached under the plain error doctrine.
Mr. Rust also argues that this Court should reverse his convictions for conspiracy
to distribute methamphetamine and money laundering because the State's evidence was
insufficient. He contends that the State's witness, Florence, provided inherently
~

improbable testimony regarding his involvement in the distribution of methamphetamine.
Otherwise, he maintains, the State's evidence was too inconclusive and circumstantial to
support his convictions for conspiracy to distribute and money laundering. This issue is
preserved. Or, it may be reviewed for plain error.
Lastly, Mr. Rust contends that the State's evidence failed to demonstrate that he
committed false tax return on both counts. Specifically, Mr. Rust argues that the evidence
was insufficient to prove that he failed to disclose income information on his tax returns
and acted with the intent to evade the taxes his owed. Accordingly, he maintains that the
trial court plainly erred in submitting the tax counts to the jury.
ARGUMENT
I.

MR. RUST SHOULD BE GRANTED A NEW TRIAL ON THE MONEY
LAUNDERING COUNT BECAUSE THE COURT PLAINLY ERRED BY
ADMITTING OPINION TESTIMONY IN VIOLATION OF RULES 702, 704,
AND 403.
"In general, the admissibility and limits of expert testimony are governed by rules

701 through 704." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993). Rule 702 provides
that "a witness who is qualified as an expert ... may testify in the form of an opinion or
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otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Utah R. Evid. 702.
"Under rule 702, the question that must be posed prior to the admission of any expert
vJ

evidence is whether, 'on balance, the evidence will be helpful to the finder of fact."'
Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361.

"In determining 'helpfulness,' the trial court must first decide whether the subject
is within the knowledge or experience of the average individual." Id. Another "integral
element of a rule 702 determination to admit expert evidence is a balancing of the
probativeness of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice." Id. at 1363 n.12.
This balancing mimics that under rule 403 and is necessary to a determination of
'helpfulness."' Id.; see Utah R. Evid. 403.
"Traditionally, a witness 'was not allowed to offer an opinion on an ultimate issue
to be decided by the jury."' State v. Davis, 2007 UT App 13,ifl5, 155 P.3d 909.
~

"Testimony on an ultimate issue," however, "is now admissible under rule 704." Id. "An
opinion is not objectionable just because it embraces an ultimate issue." Utah R. Evid.
704(a). "Although Rule 704 abolishes the per se rule against testimony regarding ultimate
issues of fact, it does not allow all opinions." Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1231
(Utah Ct. App.), cert. denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). "[T]here are limits on an
expert's license to testify as to the legal meaning of a statute." State v. Johnson, 2009 UT
App 382,if37 n.14, 224 P.3d 720. "[O]pinions that 'tell the jury what result to reach' or
'give legal conclusions' continue to be impermissible." Davis, 2007 UT App 13, if 15.
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There are several "rationales for this prohibition. First, ' [o]pinion testimony is not
helpful to the fact finder when it is couched as a legal conclusion.' Second, testimony that
renders a legal conclusion 'tend[s] to blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the
judge, jury, and witness.' Finally, there is 'a danger that a juror may tum to the [witness's
legal conclusion] rather than the judge for guidance on the applicable law."' Id. (citations
omitted) (alterations in original). "There is no bright line between permissible questions
under Rule 704 and those that call for overbroad legal responses." Davidson, 813 P.2d at
1231. To determine whether a question is permissible, the Court will review the
testimony in context. Id.
In State v. Stringham, for example, this Court concluded that it was improper for a
prosecutor to present a hypothetical "consisting of the exact actions of which defendant
was accused" to an expert witness and then ask the expert "to give an opinion as to
whether these actions were illegal." 957 P.2d 602, 607 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), (emphasis
omitted). In that case, the defendant was charged with engaging in a pattern of unlawful
activity, communications fraud, and theft. Id. at 603. At trial, the prosecutor proposed a
hypothetical in which an individual engaged in "the exact actions of which defendant was
accused," and asked the expert whether the individual had acted lawfully. Id. at 607 &
n.15. In response, the expert testified that it was "not lawful." Id. On appeal, this Court
reversed because "[a] legal conclusion like that offered by the [expert] [was] not within

~

the province of an expert witness." Id. at 607,611; accord Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ,Il 7
(concluding that the expert rendered an improper "legal conclusion" when he "applied the
facts of the case to the prohibitions in the statute")
14
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As another example, this Court concluded in State v. Tenney that expert testimony
used to explain securities law to the jury "quite clearly" stated "an impermissible legal
conclusion." 913 P.2d 750, 756 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). In that case, the State's experts
testified "that the buy-back agreements were securities under Utah law," "that certain
information was material under the Utah Uniform Securities Act," and "that failure to
disclose certain enumerated information would be a material omission under Utah law."
Id. (emphases omitted). The Tenney court held that the defendant had "established error"

because the testimony "quite clearly state[ d] legal conclusions because the witnesses
tie[d] their opinions to the requirements of Utah law." Id.
In this case, the conclusion testimony presented by the State's money laundering
expert, Stephen Sperry, was inadmissible under rules 702 and 704 because it told the
jury what result to reach, see infra Part I.A., and under rules 702 and 403 because its
probative value, if any, was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.
ld

See infra Part LB. Moreover, its admission requires reversal because the testimony was

prejudicial. See infra Part J.C. This issue may be reviewed under the doctrine of plain
error. See infra Part I.D.
A. Sperry's Conclusion Testimony Was Inadmissible Under Rules 702 and 704.
The court erred when it permitted Sperry to make "'legal conclusions"' about the
elements of the money laundering, Davis, 2007 UT App 13,,I15, and allowed the
prosecutor to present hypotheticals "consisting of the exact actions of which [Mr. Rust]
was accused." Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607.

15
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Before the jury could return a guilty verdict, it had to find that Mr. Rust: (a)
"transport[ ed], receive[ d], or acquire[ d] the property which [wa]s in fact proceeds of
[drug dealing], knowing that the property involved represent[ ed] the proceeds of [drug
dealing];" (b) "ma[de] proceeds of [drug dealing] available to another by transaction ...
knowing that the proceeds [we]re intended to be used for the purpose of ... furthering the
commission of [unlawful drug distribution];" (c) "conduct[ed] a transaction knowing the
property involved in the transaction represent[ ed] the proceeds" of drug sales "with the
intent[] to promote" drug distribution, "conceal [the] source ... of the property," or
"avoid a transaction reporting requirement;" or (d) "knowingly accept[ed] or receive[d]
property which [wa]s represented to be proceeds of unlawful activity." Utah Code§ 7610-1903(1); R.903.
Sperry made improper legal conclusions about the elements of the offense and told
the jury what result to reach when he concluded that a list of case-specific examples
amounted to money laundering. During direct-examination, the prosecutor elicited the
following testimony:
Prosecutor: So based on your expertise as money laundering expert and
your experience in doing money laundering investigations, does the
conversion of cash into a vehicle constitute money laundering?
Sperry: Yes, it does.
Prosecutor: And does the conversion of money attained from drug sales
into a casino, does that constitute money laundering?
Sperry: Yes, it does.
Prosecutor: And does the conversion or cash received through the
distribution of drugs by wiring it on Western Union constitute money
laundering?
Sperry: Yes, it does.
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Prosecutor: And does using cash proceeds from drug sales to put onto a
prepaid debit card, does that constitute money laundering?
Sperry: Yes, it does.
Prosecutor: In your opinion is taking a large amount of cash, the proceeds
from drug sales and depositing it into a credit union, is that, does that
constitute money laundering?
Sperry: Yes, it does.
Prosecutor: In your opinion is taking a large amount of cash, the proceeds
from drug sales and depositing it into a credit union, is that, does that
constitute money laundering?
Sperry: Yes, it does.
Prosecutor: And when you move the money that originally came from the
cash back and forth between accounts, does that also constitute money
laundering?
Sperry: Yes, it does. It's the layering process which they're trying to
disguise the origin of the money where illegal activity that obtained the
cash.
Prosecutor: And if you take the money that was originally proceeds from
drug sales, deposit it into a credit union and then take money out and
purchase expensive item of personal property like a vehicle, is that also
money laundering?
Sperry: Yes, that's the integration phase of the money laundering and
that's where they're acquiring property or assets from the proceeds of
illegal activity.
Prosecutor: [I]fyou['re] carving up the amounts of drug money that
you 're depositing into a financial institution to avoid that $10,000 reporting
requirement is that money laundering?
Sperry: Yes, that's called structuring, yes.

R.1404-07; see also Addendum C.
This testimony was error. As in Tenney, Sperry "state[ d] legal conclusions." 913
P.2d at 756. Specifically, he improperly "tie[d] [his] opinions to the requirements of Utah
law" when he concluded that the hypothetical conduct posed by the prosecutor amounted
to "money laundering." Id. Moreover, Sperry's "legal conclusion[s]" were "wrong."
17
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Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607. Pursuant to the money laundering statute, the State was
required to prove that Mr. Rust had knowledge (or a representation was made) that the
money constituted the proceeds of unlawful activity or was intended to be used in
furtherance of unlawful activity. Sperry's testimony, however, suggested that merely
receiving or transacting with drug money was enough to convict-regardless of whether
Rust had knowledge that the money came from the sale of drugs. Thus, as in Stringham,
"the testimony could easily have misled the jury." 957 P.2d at 607-08.
Finally, Sperry impermissibly testified to hypothetical examples of "money
laundering" that mirrored the State's allegations. This list of conduct that purportedly
amounted to "money laundering" included (1) using the proceeds of drug sales to
purchase a vehicle, (2) conversion of money attained from drug sales into a casino, (3)
~

receiving drug money via Western Union transfer, (4) using cash proceeds from drug
sales to put onto a prepaid debit card, (5) depositing the proceeds of drug sales into a
credit union and moving it between accounts, (6) depositing drug money in amounts
under 10,000 to avoid the reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act. As in

Stringham, these hypothetical examples "consist[ ed] of the exact actions of which [Mr.
Rust] was accused." 957 P.2d at 607, 611 & n.15; accord Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ,II 7
(concluding that the expert rendered an improper "legal conclusion" when he "applied the
facts of the case to the prohibitions in the statute").
Thus, as in Tenney and Stringham, the testimony was inadmissible under rules 702
and 704 because it "state[d] legal conclusions," Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756; it gave "an
opinion as to whether [actions like Rust's] actions were illegal," Stringham, 957 P.2d at
18
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607-08; and it was incorrect and expanded the behavior criminalized by the money
~

laundering statute. Id.

B. Sperry's Conclusion Testimony Was Inadmissible Under Rules 702 and 403.
Rule 403 allows a court to exclude relevant evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of ... unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or]
misleading the jury." Utah R. Evid. 403. "Such a weighing should result in exclusion
when the evidence would have "'an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper
basis."' State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 403 (Utah 1994). '"The critical question is
whether ... testimony is so prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly weigh the
evidence."' State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, iJ138, 299 P.3d 892. In other words, "evidence
that has 'an unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame, or mislead a jury'
will be deemed inadmissible." State v. Kell, 2002 UT 106,iJ30, 61 P.3d 1019.
Here, the court erred by admitting Sperry's testimony because it was inadmissible
under rules 702 and 403. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363 n.12. As explained above,
Sperry's testimony made improper legal conclusions on elements of money laundering in
relation to the facts of the case. See supra Part I.A. Sperry's testimony had no probative
value because it was '"couched as a legal conclusion."' See Davis, 2007 UT App 13,iJ15.
("'[O]pinion testimony is not helpful to the fact finder when it is couched as a legal
~

conclusion."'). On the contrary, such testimony served only to unfairly prejudice Mr.
Rust, mislead and confuse the jury, '"blur the separate and distinct responsibilities of the
judge, jury, and witness,"' and create a danger that the jurors might "'tum to [Sperry]

vb

rather than the judge for guidance on the applicable law."' Id.; see Johnson, 2009 UT
19
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

App 382, if37 n.14. Thus, this Court should reverse because the State's expert testimony
~

would not help the trier of fact, as required by rule 702, and was unduly prejudicial under
rule 403.
C. This Court Should Reverse Because Sperry's Testimony Prejudiced Mr.
Rust.
An appellate court will "' overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper
evidence"' if the evidence reasonably affected "'the likelihood of a different verdict."'

State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, if34, 163 P.3d 695. To establish prejudice, Mr. Rust
need not show "that the jury would have more likely than not" returned a different verdict
but for the erroneously admitted evidence. State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14, if92, 152 P.3d
321. Rather, error is prejudicial if there is "a probability sufficient to undermine [the
Court's] confidence in the outcome." Id. In this case, there was a reasonable probability
of a different result but for Sperry's improper expert testimony.
As discussed, to return a guilty verdict, the jury had to find that Mr. Rust had
knowledge (or a representation was made) that the money constituted the proceeds of
unlawful activity or was intended to be used in furtherance of unlawful activity. See Utah
Code§ 76-10-1903(1); R.903. Sperry's testimony negatively impacted this element.
Sperry's implication that money laundering could be committed without a
culpable mental state "could easily have misled the jury" into convicting based on noncriminal conduct. Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607-08. For instance, Sperry told the jury that a
person commits money laundering "when [he] move[s] the money that originally came
from [drug sales] back and forth between accounts" or uses that money for gambling or
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to purchase property. See R.1404-07. This testimony was incorrect and misleading
because Sperry failed to acknowledge the requirement that the defendant must be aware
that the money was associated with illegal drug activity. Utah Code§ 76-10-1903(1).
Moreover, the testimony created a danger that the jurors might rely on Sperry rather than
the judge for guidance on the law and might rely on Sperry rather than their own
judgment of the evidence in returning a verdict. Indeed, Mr. Rust contends that the jury's
~

verdict was not strongly supported by the record. See State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 187
(Utah 1990).
As discussed in greater detail below, the evidence showing Rust's participation in
the distribution of narcotics was circumstantial. See infra Part II.A. I. No one ever
witnessed Rust purchase or sell methamphetamine, and police failed to find drugs despite
multiple searches of his property. See R.1157-61, 1165-67, 1204, 1354-62. Moreover,
there was evidence from which the jury could have found that Rust earned large
quantities of money from high stakes gambling or another legitimate source. See infra
Part II.A. I. As an example, because the State only examined Rust's financials in years
2011 and 2012, the jury could have believed that Rust legitimately earned the money in a
~

year prior to 2011-perhaps via a substantial win at a casino, an inheritance, or some
other legitimate source. R.1370, 1426.
~

To the extent the jury believed that the source of the money was the sale of drugs,
there was evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Susanna Rust was a
drug-dealer, and Rust did not know that the money represented the proceeds of drug
dealing. For instance, Florence claimed that she was arrested while taking $17,000 to
21
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Susana Rust to pay for methamphetamine. R.1306-07. And evidence showed that the

contacts "ghost" and "ghost I" were attributed to an account belonging to Susana.
R.1409, 1417; State's Ex. 25. Moreover, Susana Rust's name-not Mr. Rust's namewas associated with two out of the three bank accounts. See R.1418-19; State's Bxs. 2728. In fact, the State did not produce any evidence of who deposited the cash into the
accounts. R.1420-21. The jury also heard evidence that Mr. Rust spent periods of time in
Nevada. R.1341-42. This supported an inference that Rust was unaware of Susana Rust's
unlawful endeavors, and he believed that the money came from a legitimate source, such
as their janitorial business. Nevertheless, even if the jury believed that Mr. Rust lacked
the requisite knowledge, Sperry's incorrect definition of money laundering and his
suggestion that Mr. Rust's conduct fell within this definition could have led the jurors to
6w

convict.
Finally, the erroneous testimony was not cured by the jury instructions given in
this case. See R.903; compare Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1363; and Johnson, 2009 UT App
382,ifiJ3 8-3 9. The jury instructions correctly set forth the elements of money laundering,
see R.903, but this was insufficient to neutralize the prejudicial effect of Sperry's

testimony. Given the complex nature of the State's money laundering case, which
included various complicated financial summaries and other forms of accounting,
Sperry's conclusion would have been especially persuasive to the jury. See State's Bxs.
27-28, 37-41. "[T]here is 'a danger"' that the jurors relied on Sperry's expertise rather
than studying the instructions and coming to their own conclusions. Davis, 2007 UT App
ijµ
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13,,r 15. There is also a danger that the jury deferred to Sperry's expertise even if they
were inclined to believe differently. See Larsen, 865 P.2d at 1361.
In short, Mr. Rust argues that there was a reasonable likelihood of acquittal but for
Sperry's improper testimony. Accordingly this Court should reverse.

D. The Improperly Admitted Opinion Testimony May be Reviewed for Plain
Error.
"The plain error exception [to the preservation rule] enables the appellate court to
'balance the need for procedural regularity with the demands of fairness."' Holgate, 2000
UT 74, iJ13. "'At bottom, the plain error rule's purpose is ... to avoid injustice."' Id. "To
demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that '(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error
should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the
error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or
phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined."' Id. "'To show
obviousness of the error,"' the defendant "'must show that the law was clear at the time
of trial."' State v. Beck, 2006 UT App 177, iJ9, 136 P.3d 1288, aff'd, 2007 UT 60, 165
P.3d 1225.
Mr. Rust contends that the trial court plainly erred by admitting Sperry's improper
opinion testimony. Parts I.A-B showed that the court's admission of this testimony was
error, and Part I.C showed that the testimony was prejudicial. The impropriety of the
comments was also obvious because the governing law was clear at the time of trial.
Rules 702, 704, and 403 as well as the case law interpreting those rules provided clear
guidance regarding the limits of expert opinion testimony. Utah R. Evid. 702, 704, 403;
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Davis, 2007 UT App 13, ,r15, Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607; Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756. For
instance, the law provided that witnesses who "tie their opinions to the requirements of
Utah Law" "quite clearly state[ improper] legal conclusions" and admission of such
testimony constitutes "error [that] should[] be[] obvious to the court." Tenney, 913 P.2d
750, 756. Likewise, it was clear that prosecutors cannot present hypotheticals "consisting
of the exact actions of which defendant was accused" and then ask the expert "to give an
opinion as to whether these actions were illegal." Stringham, 957 P.2d at 607 (emphasis
omitted); Davis, 2007 UT App 13,iJl 7. Thus, the impropriety of the expert opinion
testimony was obvious and prejudicial, and this Court may review it for plain error.

Il. TIDS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MR. RUST'S CONVICTIONS FOR
CONSPIRACY TO DISTRIBUTE METHAMPHETAMINE AND MONEY
LAUNDERING BECAUSE THE STATE PRODUCED INSUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT HIS CONVICTIONS.
Mr. Rust contends that his convictions for conspiracy to distribute
methamphetamine and money laundering should be reversed because the State failed to
introduce evidence sufficient to support the charged crimes. This Court will '"reverse the
jury's verdict in a criminal case when'" it concludes "'as a matter of law that the
evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction."' State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,

,r10, 2 P.3d 954. It will "'view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict,"'
and reverse "'if the evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
~

minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the
crime.""' Id.
~
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Although the burden of establishing insufficiency of the evidence "is high, it is not
impossible." Id. This court "'will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the
evidence."' Id. '"Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt."' Id. And even though "the court must ordinarily accept the jury's
determination of witness credibility, when the witness's testimony is inherently
improbable, the court may choose to disregard it." State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, if 16,
210 P.3d 288. In fact, "[i]n a criminal case ... the trial court may afford less deference to
inherently improbable, inconsistent, uncorroborated witness testimony." Id. Indeed, "[a]
conviction not based on substantial reliable evidence cannot stand." Id. ifl4.
Mr. Rust contends that this Court should reverse his convictions for conspiracy
and money laundering because Florence's testimony regarding Rust's drug dealing was
inherently improbable and otherwise, the State's evidence was too inconclusive and
circumstantial. See infra Part II.A. This issue is preserved. Or, to the extent it is not, the
issue may be reviewed for plain error. See infra Part 11.B.

A. Reasonable Minds Must Have Entertained a Reasonable Doubt That Mr.
Rust Committed Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine and Money
Laundering.
Mr. Rust maintains that his convictions for conspiracy to distribute and money
laundering were not based on substantial reliable evidence. To sustain a conviction for
conspiracy to distribute, the State must demonstrate that the defendant "intend[ed] that
the conduct constituting [distribution of a controlled substance] be performed" and
"agree[d] with [another] ... to engage in or cause the performance of [distribution of the
controlled substance methamphetamine.]" Utah Code§§ 76-4-201; 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii).
25
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Distribution of a controlled substance is defined as "knowingly and intentionally ...
distribut[ing] a controlled ... substance, or [] agree[ing], consent[ing], offer[ing], or
arrang[ing] to distribute a controlled ... substance." Utah Code§ 58-37-8{l)(a)(ii);
R.907.

1

Meanwhile, a person is guilty of money laundering if he:
(a) transports, receives, or acquires the property which is in fact proceeds of
the specified unlawful activity, knowing that the property involved
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity;
(b) makes proceeds of unlawful activity available to another by transaction,
transportation, or other means, knowing that the proceeds are intended to be
used for the purpose of continuing or furthering the commission of
specified unlawful activity;
(c) conducts a transaction knowing the property involved in the transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity with the intent:
(i) to promote the unlawful activity;
(ii) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or
control of the property; or
(iii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this chapter or
under federal law; or
(d) knowingly accepts or receives property which is represented to be
proceeds of unlawful activity.

($;.,

(i.,

Utah Code§ 76-10-1903(1); R.903. Proof that a representation was made or the
defendant had knowledge that the property involved constituted the "proceeds of
~

unlawful activity" is an element common to each variation of money laundering. See id.
In this case, Mr. Rust contends that Florence presented inherently improbable
testimony regarding Rust's involvement in the distribution of methamphetamine. See

1

The legislature amended Utah Code§ 58-37-8 after the charges were filed in this
case. However, those amendments did not substantively change subsection 58-378(1)(a)(ii)-the provision under which Mr. Rust was charged. Accordingly, Mr. Rust
cites to the current version of the statute.
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infra Part II.A.2. And otherwise, Rust maintains that the State's evidence was insufficient
to show that he agreed with another to cause the distribution of methamphetamine and
intended that such distribution be performed. See infra Part II.A.3. The evidence is also
insufficient to show that Mr. Rust knew that the money and property in this case
constituted proceeds of unlawful activity. See infra Part II.A.4.

1.

The Marshaled Evidence Supporting the Verdict.

When raising an insufficient evidence claim, the defendant '"must marshal the
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict."' State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,
iJ14, 989 P.2d 1065. The marshaling requirement is "a natural extension of an appellant's
burden of persuasion," not a ground for procedural default. State v. Nielsen, 2014 UT 10,

,I41, 326 P.3d 645.
The State provided the following evidence to support its claim that Mr. Rust
committed conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and money laundering:
o

The West Valley Police Department received a tip about Rust's involvement in
narcotics distribution. R.1115-16, 1156. Officers claimed they observed short stay
traffic at his home. R.1116-19. On two occasions, police recovered
methamphetamine in the possession of individuals leaving the Rust home. R.112930, 1158-61; State's Exs. 2-3.

o

A search of Rust's Hummer revealed a "glass pipe" "with a burnt white residue," a
cell phone, and two small notebooks officers believed were "owe sheets"-ledgers
used by drug dealers to document the "drugs out, money in and money owed."
R.1136-37, 1164-65, 1180-83, 1187-89, 1219; State's Exs.11-12. R.1136-37. The
notebook contained the words "And" and "baby," the names of individuals linked
to the distribution of methamphetamine. R.1187-88, 1202, 1208-09; State's Ex.
11.

l.i
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o

A search of Mr. Rust's Woodridge Drive residence revealed a "fraudulent"
identification card in the name of Robert Rust, another purported "owe sheet," W2G receipts from Nevada Casinos, "very large bladed knives," drug paraphernalia
in the form of a syringe, and a small baggy containing white residue. R.1189-92,
1199, 1194-95, 1197-98, 1379; State's Ex. 13.

o

From Rust's Hidden View Drive residence, police located more alleged "owe
sheets," W-2G gambling forms, wire transfer receipts with Rust's name on them,
financial documents, a scale believed to be associated with drug distribution,
expensive jeans, a stolen plasma cutter (officers testified that individuals
sometimes pay for drugs in stolen property), and $8,744 in bundled up cash, which
officers testified was consistent with narcotics trafficking. R.1169, 1214-23;
State's Exs. 15A-E, 16, 17, 18A-F. At the home of Susana Rust's son in South
Jordan, police found a hidden receipt for an America First Credit Union bank
account registered to Susana Rust in the amount of $28,380.37. R.1168-69.

o

Police believed an individual by the name of Bobby Tate sold Rust's drugs.
R.1224, 1244-46, 1305. Tate's girlfriend, Florence, was arrested with a large
amount of methamphetamine while taking $17,000 of bundled up denominations
to the Rust residence to pay for methamphetamine. R.1306-07, 1348-52.

° Florence testified to three encounters during which she believed Tate purchased
drugs from Rust: (1) an encounter at Rust's Woodridge home where a "Mexican"
allegedly came with methamphetamine and Rust and Tate then "split it up,"
R.1310-11, 1354; (2) an encounter at a Hooter's where Rust arrived in his
Hummer, Tate entered the Hummer, and Tate returned to his vehicle with a
quarter pound of methamphetamine and without the $4000 he previously had.
R.1314-16,1355-56; and (3) an encounter at a hotel where Rust arrived in his
Hummer, Tate rendezvoused with Rust in the hotel parking lot, and Tate returned
to the hotel room with another quarter pound of methamphetamine he did not
previously have. R.1316-17, 1360-61.
o

Florence also testified that she assisted Tate in selling methamphetamine, who
often picked up about 2 pounds of the drug a day. R.1313. Tate would make
arrangements to buy and sell methamphetamine by calling or texting on his cell
phone. R.1327, 1355. At trial, Florence identified a cell phone that she believed
belonged to Tate. R.1253-54, 1329, 1409, 1417; State's Exs. 24-25. That phone
contained text messages from a contact referred to as "ghost" and "ghost 1." Id.
According to Florence and police officers, "ghost" was Robert Rust's nickname.
Id. Florence claimed that the texts received from "ghost" related to the purchase of
drugs. R.1328-40; Ex. 24A-B

~

~
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o

Florence testified that when Rust was in Nevada gambling, Tate would arrange to
purchase methamphetamine on his phone, wire money to Rust, and then pick up
methamphetamine from "Mexicans," who would package the drug in "Honey
Bun" boxes. R.1341-42, 1346; State's Exs. 18 & 20C. On one occasion, Tate was
arrested after fleeing from the police and throwing a number of items out the car
window. R.1224-34, 1236-37; Exs. 20-23. One of these items was a "Honey Bun"
box containing methamphetamine. Id. Tate's arrest for illegal drugs on this
occasion was one of many. R.1247. Police claimed that Rust was more "careful"
in avoiding detection. R.1258-59.

o

The State's expert examined Rust's financials and tax records during the 16-month
period between January, 2011 and May, 2012. R.1370-71, 1412. He identified two
legitimate sources of income, which included income from a Panda Express
restaurant and Jani-King, the Rust's janitorial business. Id. In 2011, the Rusts
received income of $14,484.24 from Panda Express and $2,538.19 from JaniKing. R.1373-75; State's Exs. 37-41. And in 2012, they received $4,312.63 from
Panda Express and $5,575.26 from Jani-King. Id. According to the expert, there
were no other legitimate sources of income located. R.1375, 1412. The expert
made a summary of the Rusts' disposable income and concluded that $351,262.60
of that income came from illegal activity. R.1412, 1433.

o

The expert also identified three American First Credit Union bank accounts,
"Account 1 (0207)," "Account 2 (7797)," and "Account 3 (0221)." R.1383-86;
State's Exs. 27-28. Account 1 was in the name of Robert Rust and Accounts 2 and
3 were in the name of Susana Rust. Id. The expert testified that $78,455, $13,400,
$27,161 was deposited into Accounts 1, 2, and 3 respectively in 2011, and $6,200,
$43,250, $2,795 deposited into Accounts 1, 2, and 3 respectively in 2012. R.138386; State's Exs. 27-28. He further testified that the majority of the deposits were
cash deposits not coming from Panda Express or Jani-King. R.1384-85; State's
Ex. 28. The expert testified that these accounts revealed evidence of
"structuring"-depositing money in amount under 10,000 into several accounts to
avoid the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act-as well as evidence of
"layering"-transferring money between multiple accounts in order to make it
more difficult to trace its source. R.1387-90. According to the expert,
"structuring," "layering," and depositing cash from drug sales are forms of money
laundering. R.1406-07.

o

Police received information regarding "a considerable amount of money" that Rust
had lost gambling at the Golden Nugget Casino in Wendover, Nevada. R.1131-33.
The expert reviewed records of Rust's gambling activity from the Golden Nugget
Casino. R.1380-81; see also State's Ex. 4 (2011 records revealing $133,650.00 put
into the slot machine, $107,319.50 out of the machine, and adjusted losses of
$24,330.50), (2012 records revealing $250,919.00 put into the slot machine,

~

~
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$203,806.00 out of the machine, and adjusted losses of $44,363.00). He testified
that "it's not unusual" for drug dealers to use casinos to launder money. R1381-82.
The expert further explained that individuals often use W-2G gambling winning
receipts or casino accounts to make it look like "money ... came from gambling
rather than illegal activity" R.1381. That constitutes money laundering, he said.
R.1404.
o

The Rusts purchased a Cadillac Escalade in cash and purchased a Hummer by
cashier's check and cash. R.1390-93; State's Bxs. 34-36. According to the expert,
the large cash purchases suggested that Rust had access to large amounts of cash
from illegitimate sources. R.1394-95.

o

The expert summarized wire transfers sent to Rust and his wife-in total, about
10-12 transfers amounting to $5,894 in 2011 and $26,886 in 2012. R.1395-98;
State's Ex. 30. Tate and Rust himself were among the sending parties. R.1397-99;
State's Ex. 30. The expert also testified about Rust's use of prepaid debit cards.
R.1399-1402; State's Bxs. 31-33. He testified that drug dealers often wire money
to themselves and use prepaid debit cards to avoid carrying large quantities of
cash. R.1399. According to the expert, receiving drug money via wire transfer and
using drug money to purchase vehicles and reload prepaid debit cards constitutes
money laundering. R.1404-07.
Mr. Rust maintains that the marshaled evidence is insufficient to show that he

~

committed both conspiracy and money laundering because Florence presented inherently
improbable testimony and the State's evidence was otherwise inconclusive.

2.

Florence's Testimony was Incredibly Dubious

A court may choose to disregard witness testimony when it is "inherently
improbable." Robbins, 2009 UT 23, ifl3. Inherently improbable evidence is either "(l)

~

physically impossible or (2) apparently false." Id. ifl6. Evidence is apparently false when
it is "incredibly dubious" or '"where a sole witness presents inherently contradictory
testimony that is equivocal or the result of coercion, and there is a complete lack of
circumstantial evidence of guilt."' Id. ifl8; State v. Marks, 2011 UT App 262, if76, 262
P.3d 13. Moreover, "[s]ubstantial inconsistencies in a sole witness's testimony, though
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not directed at the core offense, can create a situation where the prosecution cannot be
said to have proven the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Robbins, 2009 UT
23, ,II 7.
In this case, Rust contends that Florence was subject to coercive pressures and had
a motive to fabricate. After Florence was arrested and pleaded guilty to distribution of a
controlled substance in federal court, she was offered a reduced sentence in exchange for
her testimony. R.1307-09, 1348-1350; Ex. 26. Recognizing that she faced a lengthy fiveyear minimum mandatory sentence, Florence admitted that she agreed to testify against
Mr. Rust in hopes that she would receive a reduced sentence. Id. Florence only ended up
serving 17 months in prison followed by probation. R.1350. Accordingly, Mr. Rust
contends that Florence had a strong motive to testify favorably on the State's behalf and
fabricate testimony against him.
Additionally, Mr. Rust contends that Florence's testimony suffered from
inconsistencies. For instance, Florence testified to an encounter where a "Mexican"
individual sold Mr. Rust drugs, but admitted during cross-examination that she never
witnessed Rust purchase drugs from this individual. See R.1311, 1354. In fact, Florence
~

never personally witnessed Rust sell drugs to Tate or purchase drugs from "the
Mexicans." R.1354-56, 1360-61. Florence also admitted that she had gotten high on two
out of the three occasions Rust and Tate allegedly transacted for drugs. R.1310, 1358-59.
Therefore, Mr. Rust argues that Florence's testimony was incredibly dubious because she
had a strong motive to fabricate, never witnessed Rust sell or purchase drugs, and was
high during the majority of her encounters with Rust.
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3.

The State's Evidence is Insufficient to Demonstrate that Mr. Rust Committed
Conspiracy to Distribute Methamphetamine.

Mr. Rust maintains that the evidence was otherwise insufficient to convict him of
conspiracy to distribute because the State failed to demonstrate that he agreed with
another to cause the distribution of methamphetamine and intended that such distribution
be performed. As discussed, Florence presented incredibly dubious testimony that was
unreliable and the result of coercion. See supra Part II.A.2. Otherwise, Mr. Rust contends
that the State's evidence was too inconclusive and circumstantial to support his
conviction.
There was no testimony from anyone who personally witnessed Mr. Rust purchase

~

or sell methamphetamine. For instance, with regard to the individuals found in possession
of methamphetamine after leaving Rust's home, officers did not witness any type of
transaction or observe these individuals exiting the home with drugs. R.1157-61. Nor did
they conclusively establish that Rust was even home at the time. See id. And, despite
multiple searches of Rust's residences and vehicle, officers never located a distributable
quantity of methamphetamine. R.1165-67, 1204.
Moreover, Mr. Rust contends that the evidence recovered from the various
searches did not give rise to a reasonable inference that he agreed or intended to
distribute methamphetamine. Police never performed a test for drugs on the "glass pipe"
or the small baggy containing a white substance. R.1164, 1188-89, 1201, 1207-08. In
fact, the small baggy was found among the possessions of Andrew Beck, another
occupant of Mr. Rust's Woodridge Drive home. R.1207-08. Meanwhile, the purported

32
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

"owe sheets," which also listed names like "Big D construction," did not even reveal any
dollar signs and failed to otheiwise indicate that the numerical computations were related
to drug distribution activities. R.1202; State's Ex. 11. And scales, knives, and syringes
have many lawful purposes, and there was no evidence that these items were tested for
drugs either.
The $8,744 in cash at the Hidden View Drive home, the expensive vehicles and
clothes, and the sizable bank accounts also did not demonstrate any agreement or intent
that methamphetamine be distributed. The State only examined Rust's financials and
gambling activities in years 2011 and 2012. R.1370, 1426. Accordingly, there is no way
to tell if the large quantities of money, including the cash, were acquired by a substantial
win at a casino, an inheritance, or some other legitimate source. Moreover, based on
evidence that Susana Rust and Mr. Rust jointly occupied the Hidden View Drive home
and two out of the three bank accounts were in Susana Rust's name, there is a reasonable
inference that the money did not even belong to Mr. Rust. R.1134, 1167-68, Exs. 27-28.
Nor did the wire transfers to Rust from senders like Bobby Tate reveal an agreement or
intent to distribute methamphetamine. All those transfers were from individuals in Utah
to Rust in Nevada, which indicates the transfers were merely sent for purposes of
supplying Rust with gambling money. R.1397-98; State's Ex. 30.
The text messages sent to Tate from "ghost" and "ghost 1" are also inconclusive.
The State did not convincingly establish that the phone containing the messages even
belonged to Tate. See R.1249, 1328. Moreover, the contacts "ghost" and "ghost 1" were
attributed to an account belonging to Susana Rust, not Mr. Rust. R.1409, 1417; State's
33
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Ex. 25. And the text messages themselves did not even mention methamphetamine. See
State's Ex. 24A-B.
Nor did the "Honey Bun" box of methamphetamine establish Rust's involvement
in the distribution of methamphetamine. Not only did the police fail to locate any "Honey
Bun" boxes in the search of Rust's property, but the box itself did not reveal any of
Rust's DNA or fingerprints. R.1237-38. Indeed, Rust was never even present when Tate
and Florence would pick up the "Honey Bun" boxes containing methamphetamine from
"the Mexicans." R.1362. This suggests that Tate and these "Mexican" individuals, not
Mr. Rust, were involved in a conspiracy to distribute. Finally, the tips and information
that law enforcement received from anonymous individuals should be given little weight.
These individuals were not identified, and the reliability of their information is
questionable.
In light of Florence's incredibly dubious testimony and the State's otherwise
inconclusive evidence, Mr. Rust contends that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that he committed conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine.
4.

The Evidence is Insufficient to Support the State's Claim that Mr. Rust
Committed Money Laundering

Mr. Rust also contends that the State's evidence is insufficient to convict him of
money laundering because it failed to demonstrate that Rust knew the money and
property constituted proceeds of unlawful activity. He argues that Florence's inherently
improbable testimony should be disregarded, and the State's evidence was otherwise too
inconclusive and circumstantial to sustain his conviction.
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As discussed above, the evidence is insufficient to show Rust's participation in the
distribution of narcotics. See Part II.A.3. Additionally, the State only examined Rust's
financials and gambling activities in years 2011 and 2012. Thus, there is no way to tell if
the large quantities of money were acquired via a substantial win at a casino, an
inheritance, or some other legitimate source. R.1370, 1426.
Instead of showing that the money and personal property (including the vehicles)
constituted proceeds of illegal activity, Mr. Rust maintains the evidence suggests that the
money/property were the proceeds of lawful gambling. While the State produced records
from the Wendover Nugget revealing net losses, there was evidence that Rust gambled at
other Nevada casinos-potentially incurring net wins. R.1425. The State, however, did
not produce records from those casinos. Id. Given his frequent gambling in casinos across
Nevada, Mr. Rust argues that reasonable minds would have concluded that the
money/property were the proceeds of high-stakes gambling, not drug-distribution. He
further maintains that the wire transfer evidence does not change this. Those transfers
occurred while Rust was in Nevada, which indicates the money was sent to him so he
could gamble it at the casinos. R.1397; State's Ex. 30. Likewise, the prepaid debit card
evidence indicates that Rust used those cards to access money for gambling and other
expenses while staying in Nevada. R.1399-1402; State's Exs. 31-33.
~

Even if the source of the money was the sale of drugs, Rust argues the evidence
suggests that Susana Rust dealt methamphetamine, and Rust lacked knowledge that the
money represented the proceeds of drug dealing. For instance, Florence claimed that she
was arrested while taking $17,000 to Susana Rust to pay for methamphetamine. R.130635
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07. And evidence showed that the contacts "ghost" and "ghost l" were attributed to an
account belonging to Susana. R.1409, 1417; State's Ex. 25. Moreover, Susana Rust's
name-not Mr. Rust's name-was associated with two out of the three bank accounts.

See R.1418-19; State's Exs. 27-28. In fact, the State did not produce any evidence of who
deposited the cash into the accounts. R.1420-21. The jury also heard evidence that Mr.
Rust spent a significant amount of time in Nevada gambling. R.1341-42. This suggests
that Rust was unaware that the money was unlawfully obtained, and he believed that the
money came from a legitimate source, such as the family janitorial business.
In light of the State's inconclusive and circumstantial evidence, Mr. Rust contends
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he knew the
money/property constituted proceeds of unlawful activity. Accordingly, he argues, the
State's evidence is insufficient to sustain his money laundering conviction.

B. Trial Counsel Preserved This Issue.
This issue is preserved. See Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, ,r12, 266 P.3d
828 ("An issue is preserved for appeal when it has been 'presented to the district court in
such a way that the court has an opportunity to rule on [it]"'). At the close of the State's
case, defense counsel made a motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the evidence was
insufficient with respect to the conspiracy and money laundering counts. R.1471.
Specifically, counsel argued that the State's evidence was insufficient to show that "Mr.
Rust made illegal proceeds from the selling of narcotics." R.14 71. He further pointed out
that "[a]ll the evidence surrounding that was very circumstantial [and] not sufficient to go
to the jury." R.1471.
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To the extent this issue is not preserved, however, this Court may review the issue
for plain error. To demonstrate plain error with respect to an insufficient evidence
challenge, the defendant must establish that ( 1) "that the evidence was insufficient to
support [his] conviction" and (2) "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental
that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
ifl 7, 10 P.3d 346.
As shown, the evidence was insufficient to support Rust's conspiracy and money
laundering convictions. See supra Part II.A. And the evidence was obviously inherently
improbable and inconclusive because, as argued above, Florence had a strong motive to
fabricate her testimony and the State's evidence otherwise rested on unconvincing,
circumstantial evidence. See id. Mr. Rust maintains that these insufficiencies were "so
obvious and fundamental" that the trial court erred in submitting these counts to the jury.

Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ifl 7.

III. TIDS COURT SHOULD REVERSE MR. RUST'S FALSE TAX RETURN
CONVICTIONS BECAUSE THE STATE'S EVIDENCE WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT BOTH COUNTS CHARGED.
Mr. Rust also argues that both of his convictions for filing a false tax return should
be reversed because the State's evidence was insufficient. See Gonzales, 2000 UT App
136, ,r10 (explaining that appellate courts '"view the evidence in a light most favorable to
the jury verdict,"' and reverse "'if the evidence is so "inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the
defendant committed the crime."'"); supra Part II.
To sustain a false tax return conviction, the State's evidence must demonstrate that
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the defendant "fail[ed] ... to supply any information within the time required by law or .
. . supplie[d] [] false or fraudulent information" and did so "with intent to evade any tax."
Utah Code§ 76-8-ll0l(l)(c)(i) (2009) (emphasis added); R.909. 2 Mr. Rust contends that
the marshaled evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that he acted with the intent to
evade the payment of his taxes.

A. The Marshaled Evidence Supporting the Verdict.
As discussed, a defendant '"must marshal the evidence in support of the verdict
and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict."' Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, if 14. In this case, the State provided the
following evidence to demonstrate that Mr. Rust committed false tax return with respect
to the taxes he filed in 2011 and 2012:
o

To support its claim that Mr. Rust failed to supply income information on his 2011
and 2012 tax returns, the State sought to establish that Rust earned income from
distribution of methamphetamine. For the marshaled evidence supporting Mr.
Rust's alleged involvement in illegal drug distribution and earnings from these
activities, see supra Part I.A. I.

o

The State's tax expert testified that individuals are required to report wage and
self-employment income, both legal and illegal, as well as other types of income,
such as gambling winnings 3 and bank account interest. R.1448-51, 1465; Ex. 47.

o

The Rust's 2011 joint tax return listed three dependent nieces and nephews,
however, a search of the Rust's homes revealed no children living with them.
R.1139, 1440-41, 1444; State's Exs. 42-44. The 2011 tax records list $16,707 in
wages and $10 in interest, with total income reported as $16,717. R.1441-4 3;
2

The legislature amended Utah Code § 76-8-1101 in 2014 after the charges had
been filed in this matter.
3

The expert explained that a person who seeks to deduct gambling losses against
gambling winnings must fill out a "Schedule A" form. R.1464-65. The difference
between the winnings and losses is the taxable income. Id. Mr. Rust did not file a
"Schedule A" form with his income taxes. Id.
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State's Exs. 42-44. The Rusts did not report income from Jani-King or any other
income, such as gambling winnings. Compare R.1376, 1413; State's Exs. 42-44
(Rust's 2011 tax return); with State's Ex. 4 (records of Rust's gambling winnings
in 2011), State's Ex. 41 (summary of Rust's income in 2011).
o

In 2012, Rust claimed one dependent, listing his relationship to this dependent as
"other." R.1454; State's Exs. 45-46. The expert testified that, without other
indicators, designating a dependent as "other" would necessarily fail to meet the
relationship test for lawfully claiming dependents. R.1454. The 2012 tax
documents revealed $15,095 in business income with adjusted gross income
amounting to $14,029. R.1454-55; State's Exs. 45-46. It did not list wages from
Panda Express or other sources of income, including gambling winnings or
interest. Compare R.1454-60; State's Exs. 45-46 (Rust's 2012 tax return); with
State's Ex. 4 (records of Rust's gambling winnings in 2012), State's Ex. 41
(summary of Rust's income in 2012).

o

A search of Mr. Rust's home revealed various Form W-2G documents, the
requisite forms for reporting gambling winnings. R.1194-95, 1220; State's Exs.
18A-F. At no time did Mr. Rust amend his tax return. R.1468.

B. Reasonable Minds Must Have Entertained a Reasonable Doubt That Mr.
Rust Acted With the Intent to Evade his Taxes.

Mr. Rust contends that the marshaled evidence is insufficient to show that he
omitted income information from his 2011 and 2012 tax returns with the intent to evade
~

the taxes he owed.
First, the State only examined Rust's tax returns from years 2011 and 2012.
R.1463. Accordingly, Rust argues that it is reasonable to conclude that he lawfully
reported quantities of the allegedly-omitted income in a year prior to 2011. Indeed, there
was no evidence that the IRS pursued action against Mr. Rust, or what specific amount, if
any, he owed to the government in taxes.
Furthermore, Mr. Rust maintains the evidence shows that any income earned
constituted the proceeds of lawful employment and gambling. See supra Part II.A.3-4.
And he contends there is little evidence indicating that he omitted gambling or
39
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employment income with the intent to evade his taxes. Rather, the evidence indicates a
good faith basis for omitting this income. For instance, Mr. Rust did not even have the
correct form to make the requisite gambling disclosures on his 2011 tax return. R.146364. He also could have believed that because the IRS requires casinos to report gambling
winnings, he had no obligation to do so himself. R.1465-66. Additionally, the Golden
Nugget records reveal that Rust's gambling activities resulted in net losses and most of
the Form W-2G's noted only gross winnings. R.1380-81; State's Exs. 4, 18. Thus, he
could have believed in good faith that he did not have to report his gambling winnings if
he had no net winnings.
Moreover, Rust contends that the evidence is insufficient to show that he acted
with the intent to evade his taxes when he omitted employment income from Jani-King
on his 2011 tax return and from Panda Express on his 2012 return. That income was only
$2,538 and $4,312 respectively. R.1373-75; State's Exs. 37-41. Accordingly, Rust could
have believed in good faith that nominal income amounts need not be reported. And in
any event, the tax preparer he hired in 2011 could have accidently omitted the income,
even if Rust believed in good faith that she reported it. R.1440-41, 1444; State's Exs. 42~

44. The State's claim that Rust intentionally omitted interest income is also weak as it did
not produce evidence of any interest actually earned from his America First accounts.
State's Exs. 27-28.
Finally, the fact that Rust claimed dependents in 2011 and 2012 does little to
support the State's case. Although officers claimed that a 2012 search of the Rust
residence did not reveal evidence of children, this only shows that dependents were not
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living with the Rusts at that snapshot in time; the State did not offer proof that the
claimed dependents did not live with the Rusts at other points during the year. Thus, in
light of the State's inconclusive evidence, Mr. Rust maintains that his false tax return
convictions must be reversed.
C. The Trial Court's Decision to Submit the False Tax Return Counts to The
Jury Constituted Plain Error.

As discussed, to demonstrate plain error with respect to an insufficient evidence
challenge, Mr. Rust must establish that ( 1) ''that the evidence was insufficient to support
[his] conviction" and (2) "that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the
trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ~17.
Part 111.A-B demonstrates that the evidence was insufficient to support Rust's
convictions for false tax return on both counts. Mr. Rust maintains that these
insufficiencies were obvious and fundamental because the evidence suggests that any
omissions on his tax return were unintentional and made in good faith. See id. Thus, he
~

argues, the trial court plainly erred in submitting the false tax return counts to the jury.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth herein, Mr. Rust respectfully requests that this Court
reverse his convictions on all counts.
SUBMITTED this / ~f~day of February, 2016.

Attorney for Defend t/Appellant
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.
ROBERT THOMAS RUST,
Defendant.

Case No: 131901697 FS
Judge:
PAUL B PARKER
June 22, 2015
Date:

PRESENT
jennifaj
Clerk:
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): HANSEEN, SAMUEL J
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 17, 1979
Sheriff Office#: 230294
Audio
Tape Count: 1010-1022
S34
Tape Number:

CHARGES
1. MONEY LAUNDERING - 2nd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/30/2015 Guilty
2. DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANC - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/30/2015 Guilty
3. FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/30/2015 Guilty
4. FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN - 3rd Degree Felony
- Disposition: 04/30/2015 Guilty
5. DEMAND FOR FORFEITURE OF PROPERTY - Not Applicable
- Disposition: 04/30/2015 Guilty

HEARING

Defendant has a right to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing.
Defendant to pay full and complete restitution as determined at a later date.
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of MONEY LAUNDERING a 2nd Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than
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fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of DISTRIBUTE/OFFER/ARRANGE DISTRIBUTION OF
CONTROLLED SUBSTANC a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years
in the Utah State Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
counts two, three, and four to run concurrently with each other and consecutive to
count one.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE

ROBERT T III RUST

CUSTODY

•

The defendant is present in the custody of the Salt Lake County jail.
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Utah R. Evid. 403
Rule 403. Excluding Relevant Evidence for Prejudice, Confusion, Waste of Time, or
Other Reasons

The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.
20 I I Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of
the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE

(di

This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively comparable to Rule 45, Utah
Rules of Evidence ( 1971) except that "surprise" is not included as a basis for exclusion of
relevant evidence. The change in language is not one of substance, since "surprise" would
be within the concept of "unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 403. See also Advisory
Committee Note to Federal Rule 403 indicating that a continuance in most instances
would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise." See also Smith v. Estelle,
445 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Tex. I 977)(surprise use of psychiatric testimony in capital case
ruled prejudicial and violation of due process). See the following Utah cases to the same
effect. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979); State v. Johns,
615 P.2d 1260 (Utah 1980); Reiser v. Lobner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah 1982).
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Utah R. Evid. 702
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
(a) Subject to the limitations in paragraph (b), a witness who is qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.
(b)
Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the basis for
expert testimony only if there is a threshold showing that the principles or methods that
are underlying in the testimony
(I) are reliable,
(2) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and
(3) have been reliably applied to the facts.
(c) The threshold showing required by paragraph (b) is satisfied if the underlying
principles or methods, including the sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their
application to the facts of the case, arc generally accepted by the relevant expert
community.
2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part
of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make
style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be
stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence
admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE.
Apart from its introductory clause, part (a) of the amended Rule recites verbatim Federal
Ruic 702 as it appeared before it was amended in 2000 to respond to Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The 2007 amendment to the Rule added
that introductory clause, along with parts (b) and (c). Unlike its predecessor, the amended
rule does not incorporate the text of the Federal Rule. Although Utah law foreshadowed
in many respects the developments in federal law that commenced with Daubert, the
2007 amendment preserves and clarifies differences between the Utah and federal
approaches to expert testimony.
The amended rule embodies several general considerations. First, the rule is intended to
be applied to all expert testimony. In this respect, the rule follows federal law as
announced in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). Next, like its federal
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counterpart, Utah's rule assigns to trial judges a ··gatekeeper" responsibility to screen out
unreliable expert testimony. In performing their gatekeeper function, trial judges should
confront proposed expert testimony with rational skepticism. This degree of scrutiny is
not so rigorous as to be satisfied only by scientific or other specialized principles or
methods that are free of controversy or that meet any fixed set of criteria fashioned to test
reliability. The rational skeptic is receptive to any plausible evidence that may bear on
reliability. She is mindful that several principles, methods or techniques may be suitably
reliable to merit admission into evidence for consideration by the trier of fact. The fields
of knowledge which may be dra,vn upon are not limited merely to the "scientific" and
"technical", but extend to all "specialized" knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed,
not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training
or education". Finally, the gatekeeping trial judge must take care to direct her skepticism
to the particular proposition that the expert testimony is offered to support. The Daubert
court characterized this task as focusing on the "work at hand". The practitioner should
equally take care that the proffered expert testimony reliably addresses the ··work at
hand", and that the foundation of reliability presented for it reflects that consideration.

~

Section ( c) retains limited features of the traditional Frye test for expert testimony.
Generally accepted principles and methods may be admitted based on judicial notice. The
nature of the Hwork at hand" is especially important here. It might be important in some
cases for an expert to educate the factfinder about general principles, without attempting
to apply these principles to the specific facts of the case. The rule recognizes that an
expert on the stand may give a dissertation or exposition of principles relevant to the
case, leaving the trier of fact to apply them to the facts. Proposed expert testimony that
seeks to set out relevant principles, methods or techniques without offering an opinion
about how they should be applied to a particular array of facts will be, in most instances,
more eligible for admission under section ( c) than case specific opinion testimony. There
are, however, scientific or specialized methods or techniques applied at a level of
considerable operational detail that have acquired sufficient general acceptance to merit
admission under section (c ).
The concept of general acceptance as used in section ( c) is intended to replace the novel
vs. non-novel dichotomy that has served as a central analytical tool in Utah's Rule 702
jurisprudence. The failure to show general acceptance meriting admission under section
(c) does not mean the evidence is inadmissible. only that the threshold showing for
reliability under section (b) must be shown by other means.
Section (b) adopts the three genera] categories of inquiry for expert testimony contained
in the federal rule. Unlike the federal rule, however. the Utah rule notes that the
proponent of the testimony is required to make only a ··threshold" showing. That
"threshold" requires only a basic foundational showing of indicia of reliability for the
testimony to be admissible, not that the opinion is indisputably correct. When a trial
court, applying this amendment, rules that an expert's testimony is reliable, this does not
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necessarily mean that contradictory expert testimony is unreliable. The amendment is
broad enough to permit testimony that is the product of competing principles or methods
in the same field of expertise. Contrary and inconsistent opinions may simultaneously
meet the threshold; it is for the factfinder to reconcile - or choose between - the different
opinions. As such, this amendment is not intended to provide an excuse for an automatic
challenge to the testimony of every expert, and it is not contemplated that evidentiary
hearings will be routinely required in order for the trial judge to fulfill his role as a
rationally skeptical gatekeeper. In the typical case, admissibility under the rule may be
determined based on affidavits, expert reports prepared pursuant to Utah R.Civ.P. 26,
deposition testimony and memoranda of counsel.
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Utah R. Evid. 704
Rule 704. Opinion on Ultimate Issue.
(a)

In General -

Not Automatically Objectionable. An opinion is not objectionable

just because it embraces an ultimate issue.
(b)
Exception. In a criminal case, an expert witness must not state an opinion about
whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or condition that constitutes an
element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters are for the trier of fact
alone.

2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as
part of the restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to
make style and terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are
intended to be stylistic only. There is no intent to change any result in any ruling on
evidence admissibility. This rule is the federal rule, verbatim.

<,

ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
This rule is the federal rule, verbatim, and comports with Rule 56(4), Utah Rules of
Evidence (1971). See Edwards v. Didericksen, 597 P.2d 1328 (Utah 1979).
This rule is identical to Rule 704 of the Federal Rules of Evidence as amended in 1984.

~
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Utah Code § 58-37-8
Effective 10/1/2015

58-37-8. Prohibited acts -- Penalties.
( 1) Prohibited acts A -- Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly
and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce,
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or
arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c,
or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of
Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that
arc undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to
whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any
other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection ( 1)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a
controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony, punishable by imprisonment
for not more than 15 years, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is
guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, or a substance listed in Section 58-3 7-4.2 is guilty of a third
degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a
second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance or a counterfeit of a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty
of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person ,vho has been convicted of a violation of Subsection ( I )(a)(ii) or (iii)
may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law,
but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used,
carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the
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commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall additionally sentence
the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection ( I )(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree
felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than
seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence
may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B -- Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a
valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the
course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this
chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room,
tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally
to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or
distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged
prescription or written order for a controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree
felony; or
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or a controlled substance analog, is
guilty of a class A misdemeanor on a first or second conviction, and on a
third or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a
conviction under Subsection (1 )(a), that person shall be sentenced to a one degree
greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled
substances not included in Subsection (2)(b )(i) or (ii), including a substance listed
in Section 58-37-4.2, or marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a
third conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a fourth
or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior
boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a
2
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penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b ), and if the
conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b ), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively
and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or(iii) is:

(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (2)(h) who, in an offense
not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in the
person's body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent

manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 76-1-601 or the
death of another.
(h) A person who violates Subsection (2)(g) by having in the person's body:
(i) a controlled substance classified under Schedule I, other than those described
in Subsection (2)(h)(ii), or a controlled substance classified under Schedule II
is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) marijuana, tetrahydrocannabinols, or equivalents described in Subsection 5837-4(2)(a)(iii)(S) or (AA), or a substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 is guilty
of a third degree felony; or
(iii) any controlled substance classified under Schedules III, IV, or Vis guilty of
a class A misdemeanor.
(i) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering serious bodily
injury or death as a result of the person's negligent driving in violation of
Subsection 58-37-8(2)(g) whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode
of driving.
3
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(3) Prohibited acts C -- Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to
assume the title of, or represent oncsel f to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler,
apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to any
person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation
or failure by the person to disclose receiving any controlled substance from
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false
name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled
substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing
designed to print, imprint. or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the
foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a
counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) (i) A first or second conviction under Subsection (3)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) is a class
A misdemeanor.
(ii) A third or subsequent conviction under Subsection (3)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) is a
third degree felony.
(c) A violation of Subsection (3)(a)(iv) is a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D -- Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under
this chapter who commits any act that is unlawful under Subsection ( l )(a),
Section 58-37a-5, or Section 58-37b-4 is upon conviction subject to the penalties
and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds the act is
committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any
of those schools during the hours of 6 a.m. through l Op.m.;
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the
grounds of any of those schools or institutions during the hours of 6 a.m.
through IO p.m.;
4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(iii) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility during the
preschool's or facility's hours of operation;
(iv) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center when the
public or amusement park, arcade, or recreation center is open to the public;
(v) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a library when the library is open to the public;
(vii) within any area that is within I 00 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds
included in Subsections (4)(a)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), and (vi);
(viii) in the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs; or
(ix) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery,
or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an inmate or on
the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b) (i) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony
and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the penalty
that would otherwise have been established but for this Subsection (4) would
have been a first degree felony.
(ii) Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that ,vould otherwise have been established would have been
less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4 ), a person convicted
under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the maximum penalty
prescribed for that offense. This Subsection (4)( c) does not apply to a violation of
Subsection (2)(g).
(d) (i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(ix):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term
as provided by law. and the court shall additionally sentence the person
convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(8) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4 )( d) apply also to any person who,

acting with the mental state required for the commission of an offense,
directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or
intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection
(4)(a)(ix).
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(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of the
offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly
believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in
Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was as
described in Subsection (4}(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B
misdemeanor.
(6) (a) For purposes of penalty enhancement under Subsections (1) and (2), a plea of
guilty or no contest to a violation or attempted violation of this section or a plea
which is held in abeyance under Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, is the
equivalent of a conviction, even if the charge has been subsequently reduced or
dismissed in accordance with the plea in abeyance agreement.
~

(b) A prior conviction used for a penalty enhancement under Subsection (2) shall be
a conviction that is:
(i) from a separate criminal episode than the current charge; and
(ii) from a conviction that is separate from any other conviction used to enhance

the current charge.
(7) A person may be charged and sentenced for a violation of this section,
notwithstanding a charge and sentence for a violation of any other section of this
chapter.
(8) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu
of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state,
conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for the same
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a
person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a
controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the person or persons
did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
( I 0) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of the
veterinarian's professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing,
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to
be administered by an assistant or orderly under the veterinarian's direction and
supervision.
( 11) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under this chapter who manufactures, distributes, or
possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo or
6
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investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of
professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of the
officer's employment.
(12) (a) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on any Indian,
as defined in Subsection 58-3 7-2( l )(v), who uses, possesses, or transports
peyote for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion as defined in Subsection 58-3 7-2( l )(w).
(b) In a prosecution alleging violation of this section regarding peyote as defined in
Subsection 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(V), it is an affirmative defense that the peyote was
used, possessed, or transported by an Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial
purposes in connection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion.
(c) (i) The defendant shall provide written notice of intent to claim an affirmative
defense under this Subsection ( 12) as soon as practicable, but not later than
IO days prior to trial.
(ii) The notice shall include the specific claims of the affirmative defense.
(iii) The court may waive the notice requirement in the interest of justice for
good cause shown, if the prosecutor is not unfairly prejudiced by the lack
of timely notice.
(d) The defendant shall establish the affirmative defense under this Subsection ( 12)
by a preponderance of the evidence. If the defense is established, it is a complete
defense to the charges.
(13) (a) It is an affirmative defense that the person produced, possessed, or administered
a controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if the person:
(i) was engaged in medical research; and
(ii) was a holder of a valid license to possess controlled substances under
Section 58-3 7-6.
(b) It is not a defense under Subsection ( 13 )( a) that the person prescribed or
dispensed a controlled substance listed in Section 58-3 7-4.2.
(14) It is an affirmative defense that the person possessed, in the person's body, a
controlled substance listed in Section 58-37-4.2 if:
(a) the person was the subject of medical research conducted by a holder of a valid
license to possess controlled substances under Section 58-37-6; and
(b) the substance was administered to the person by the medical researcher.
( 15) The application of any increase in penalty under this section to a violation of
Subsection (2)(a)(i) may not result in any greater penalty than a second degree
felony. This Subsection ( 15) takes precedence over any conflicting provision of this
7
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(16) (a) It is an affirmative defense to an allegation of the commission of an offense
listed in Subsection ( 16 )(b) that the person:
(i) reasonably believes that the person or another person is experiencing an
overdose event due to the ingestion, injection, inhalation, or other
introduction into the human body of a controlled substance or other
substance;
(ii) reports in good faith the overdose event to a medical provider, an
emergency medical service provider as defined in Section 26-Sa- l 02, a law
enforcement officer, a 911 emergency call system, or an emergency
dispatch system, or the person is the subject of a report made under this
Subsection ( 16 );
(iii) provides in the report under Subsection ( 16)(a)(ii) a functional description
of the actual location of the overdose event that facilitates responding to the
person experiencing the overdose event;
(iv) remains at the location of the person experiencing the overdose event until
a responding law enforcement officer or emergency medical service
provider arrives, or remains at the medical care facility where the person
experiencing an overdose event is located until a responding law
enforcement officer arrives;
(v) cooperates with the responding medical provider, emergency medical
service provider, and law enforcement officer, including providing
information regarding the person experiencing the overdose event and any
substances the person may have injected, inhaled, or otherwise introduced
into the person's body; and
(vi) is alleged to have committed the offense in the same course of events from
which the reported overdose arose.
(b) The offenses referred to in Subsection (16)(a) are:
(i) the possession or use of less than 16 ounces of marijuana;
(ii) the possession or use of a scheduled or listed controlled substance other
than marijuana; and
(iii) any violation of Chapter 3 7a. Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or Chapter
3 7b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act.
(c) As used in this Subsection (16) and in Section 76-3-203.11, "good faith" does
not include seeking medical assistance under this section during the course of a
law enforcement agency's execution of a search warrant, execution of an arrest
warrant, or other lawful search.
( 17) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or
8
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circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be given effect
without the invalid provision or application.
( 18) A legislative body of a political subdivision may not enact an ordinance that is less
restrictive than any provision of this chapter.
(19) (a) If a minor who is under 18 years of age is found by a court to have violated this
section and the violation is the minor's first violation of this section, the court
may:
(i) order the minor to complete a screening as defined in Section 4 l-6a-50 I;
(ii) order the minor to complete an assessment as defined in Section 4l-6a-501
if the screening indicates an assessment to be appropriate; and
(iii) order the minor to complete an educational series as defined in Section 4 l6a-501 or substance abuse treatment as indicated by an assessment.
(b) If a minor who is under 18 years of age is found by a court to have violated this
section and the violation is the minor's second or subsequent violation of this
section, the court shall:
(i) order the minor to complete a screening as defined in Section 4l-6a-501;
(ii) order the minor to complete an assessment as defined in Section 4 l-6a-50 I
if the screening indicates an assessment to be appropriate; and

i

...l '
'

)

(iii) order the minor to complete an educational series as defined in Section 4 l6a-50 l or substance abuse treatment as indicated by an assessment.
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Utah Code § 76-4-201

76-4-20 I. Conspiracy -- Elements of offense.
cj

For purposes of this part a person is guilty of conspiracy when he, intending that
conduct constituting a crime be performed, agrees with one or more persons to engage in
or cause the performance of the conduct and any one of them commits an overt act in
pursuance of the conspiracy, except where the offense is a capital felony, a felony against
the person, arson, burglary, or robbery, the overt act is not required for the commission of
conspiracy.

Gj

~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§ 76-8-1101. Criminal offenses and penalties relating to ... , U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-1101

U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-1101 (2012)
§ 76-8-1101. Criminal offenses and penalties relating to revenue and

taxation--Rulemaking authority--Statute of limitations

(l)(a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are as provided in
Subsections ( I )(b) through (e).
(b )(i) Any person who is required by Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any laws the State
Tax Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or permit from
the State Tax Commission, who operates without having registered or secured a license or
permit, or who operates when the registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-30 l, for purposes of Subsection ( l )(b )(i), the penalty

may not:
(A) be less than $500; or
(8) exceed $1,000.
(c)(i) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax, fee, or charge as defined in Section
59-1-401 or requirement of Title 59, Revenue and Taxation, or any lawful requirement of the
State Tax Commission, fails to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any
information within the time required by law, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any
false or fraudulent return or statement. or who supplies any false or fraudulent information, is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (1 )( c)(i), the penalty
may not:
(A) be less than $1,000; or

!1
L

•i
,J
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~l
l

(B) exceed $5,000.

l

(d)(i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax, fee, or
charge as defined in Section 59-1-401 or the payment of a tax, fee, or charge as defined in
Section 59-1-401 is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree
WESTLAW
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§ 76-8-1101. Criminal offenses and penalties relating to ... , U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-1101

felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection (I)( d)(i), the penalty
may not:
(A) be less than $1,500; or
(B) exceed $25,000.

(e)(i) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if that person commits an act:
(A) described in Subsection (l)(e)(ii) with respect to one or more of the following
documents:
(I) a return;
(II) an affidavit;
(Ill) a claim; or
(IV) a document similar to Subsections (I)( e )(i)(A)(I) through (III); and
(B) subject to Subsection (I)( e )(iii), with knowledge that the document described in
Subsection (I)( e )(i)(A):
(I) is false or fraudulent as to any material matter; and
(II) could be used in connection with any material matter administered by the State
Tax Commission.
(ii) The following acts apply to Subsection (I)( e )(i):
(A) preparing any portion of a document described in Subsection (l)(e)(i)(A);
(B) presenting any portion of a document described in Subsection (l)(e)(i)(A);
Gj

(C) procuring any portion of a document described in Subsection (I)( e )(i)(A);
(D) advising in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection (I)( e )(i)(A);

(E) aiding in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
WESTLAW
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§ 76-8-1101. Criminal offenses and penalties relating to ... , U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-1101

Subsection (I)( e)(i)(A);
(F) assisting in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described in
Subsection (I)( e)(i)(A); or
(G) counseling in the preparation or presentation of any portion of a document described
in Subsection (1 )( e)(i)(A).
(iii) This Subsection (I)( e) applies:

(A) regardless of whether the person for which the document described in Subsection
( I )( e)( i)(A) is prepared or presented:
(I) knew of the falsity of the document described in Subsection (l)(e)(i)(A); or
(II) consented to the falsity of the document described in Subsection (I)( e)(i)(A); and
(B) in addition to any other penalty provided by law.
(iv) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of this Subsection (l)(e), the penalty
may not:
(A) be less than $1,500; or
(8) exceed $25,000.
(v) In accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the
State Tax Commission may make rules prescribing the documents that are similar to
Subsections (I)( e )(i)(A)(I) through (III).
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is the later of six
years:
(a) from the date the tax should have been remitted; or

•
l

t.,
I

I
I

l
l

(b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense.

l

·iJ
Credits

l

Laws 1987, c. 3~ § 57; Laws 2001, c. 177. § 2, eff. July 1, 2001; Laws 2004, c. 67, § 2, eff. May
3, 2004; Laws 2008, c. 382, § 2183, eff. May 5. 2008; Laws 2009, c. 336, § 2, eff. March 25,
2009.
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Utah Code§ 76-10-1903
76-10-1903. Money laundering.

(I) A person commits the offense of money laundering who:
(a) transports, receives, or acquires the property which is in fact proceeds of the
specified unlawful activity, knowing that the property involved represents the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity;
(b) makes proceeds of unlawful activity available to another by transaction,
transportation, or other means, knowing that the proceeds are intended to be used
for the purpose of continuing or furthering the commission of specified unlawful
activity;
(c) conducts a transaction knowing the property involved in the transaction
represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity with the intent:
(i) to promote the unlawful activity;
(ii) to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of
the property; or
(iii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under this chapter or under
federal law; or
(d) knowingly accepts or receives property which is represented to be proceeds of
unlawful activity.
(2) Under Subsection (l)(d), knowledge that the property represents the proceeds of
unlawful activity may be established by proof that a law enforcement officer or an
individual acting at the request of a law enforcement officer made the representations
and the person's subsequent statements or actions indicate that the person believed
those representations to be true.
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1

THE COURT:

I'll overrule the objection.

2

make that opinion.

3

not they believe that opinion.

4

Q

He can

It's up to the jury to decide whether or

(BY MR. CARLSON)

So based on your expertise as a

5

money laundering expert and your experience in doing money

6

laundering investigations, does the conversion of cash into a

7

vehicle constitute money laundering?

8

A

Yes,

9

Q

And does the conversion of money attained from drug

10

it does.

sales into a casino, does that constitute money laundering?

11

A

Yes,

it does.

12

Q

And does the conversion or cash received through

13

the distribution of drugs by wiring it on Western Union

14

constitute money laundering?

15

A

Yes,

it does.

16

Q

And does using cash proceeds from drug sales to put

17

onto a prepaid debit card, does that constitute money

18

laundering?

19

A

Yes,

20

Q

I'm not showing you what's been marked for

it does.

identification as State's Exhibit 49.

21

THE COURT:

22

Again,

I have the same problem,

23

deal with the foundation of these things.

24

not been offered,

25

testifying of those.

let's

Forty-eight has

33 has not been offered yet, we're
Can we proceed with the proper
108
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foundation?

1
2

MR. CARLSON:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HANSEEN:

5

THE COURT:

!

Objection?
No objection.
Received.

(State's Exhibit 48 is received)

6
7

Q

(BY MR. CARLSON)

So I show you what's been marked

8

for identification as State's Exhibit No. 49.

9

identify this?

10
11

~

We would move to admit Exhibit 48.

A
1

Yes,

Can you

this is a flow chart which I made related to

the America First Credit Union account, the money going in,

12

the transfer between accounts,

13

identified to pay part of the Hummer along with the rest of

14

cash that was also used to purchase the Hummer.

15

Q

the cashier's check that I

Okay. And does this chart depict the irregularities

16

in the account that you thought were significant in terms of

17

money laundering?

18

A

it does.

MR. CARLSON:

19
20

Yes,

We would offer State's 49 into

evidence.

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. HANSEEN:

23

THE COURT:

24

(State's Exhibit 49 is received)

25

Q

Objection?
No objection.
Received.

(BY MR. CARLSON)

And if you could again describe
109
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1
2

the irregularities that the chart depicts.
A

What the chart depicts

(inaudible) part here

3

indicates the cash going into one account - can't read the

4

account number - the one below that indicates the cash going

5

into that account and the third one down going into the third

6

account,

7

account.

8

second account is the amount of a transaction that occurred,

9

transferring money from that account to the second account

the amount of cash that was deposited into that
The arrow indicating from the bottom account to the

10

and then the arrows going up and down indicate a transaction

11

that occurred from the top account down to the bottom account

12

and then back up from the second account to the top account;

13

the cashier's check coming out of the top account, the

14

$10,000 towards the Hummer along with the remaining amount

15

that was paid towards the Hummer that was cash that was used

16

to purchase that showing the cash flowing in and layering

17

process which they were using to move the money from account

18

to account.

19

Q

Okay. So let me just ask you some question based on

20

the chart.

In your opinion is taking a large amount of cash,

21

the proceeds from drug sales and depositing it into a credit

22

union,

is that, does that constitute money laundering?

23

A

Yes,

24

Q

And when you move the money that originally came

25

it does.

from the cash back and forth between accounts, does that also
110
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1
2

constitute money laundering?
A

Yes, it does. It's the layering process which

3

they're trying to disguise the origin of the money where

4

illegal activity that obtained the cash.

5

Q

And if you take the money that was originally

6

proceeds from drug sales, deposit it into a credit union and

7

then take money out and purchase expensive item of personal

8

property like a vehicle, is that also money laundering?

9

A

Yes, that's the integration phase of the money

10

laundering and that's where they're acquiring property or

11

assets from the proceeds of illegal activity.

12

Q

And then something that's not depicted on this

13

chart but you mentioned and that is if your carving up the

14

amounts of drug money that you're depositing into a financial

15 ' institution to avoid that $10,000 reporting requirement is
16

17

that money laundering?
A

Yes, that's called structuring, yes.

18

MR. CARLSON:

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. CARLSON:

21

THE COURT:

23

MR. CARLSON:

25

You bet.
Your Honor, I can't remember if the

State offered Exhibit 33.

22

24

May I have just a second, Your Honor?

It was not offered.
We would offer 33 into evidence.

Counsel, that's the MR. HANSEEN:

Yeah, no objection.
111
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